By Amos Harel
Some of the claims made by retiring Major General Yiftah Ron-Tal, in an interview with the somewhat obscure weekly paper of Kfar Chabad, make sense. His conclusion that the fighting in Lebanon constituted a military failure for Israel is accepted by many in the Israel Defense Forces General Staff. Some of his former colleagues also agree with him that officers at the highest ranks should take personal responsibility and step down. The claim that the IDF wasted valuable time preparing for the disengagement from the Gaza Strip and forgot about a potential confrontation in the North also has some weight.
But the media debate on the issue has revolved around a different question: Was it appropriate for Ron-Tal to make these statements while still, officially, in uniform? The talk-show hosts on morning radio programs, where Ron-Tal was invited to explain some of the statements he made in the aforementioned interview, were critical. The IDF Spokesman's Office was also quick to issue a statement expressing its reservations over Ron-Tal's comments.
In reality, a different issue should be discussed: How is it that the right, despite the fact that a significant number of senior officers share its views, did not manage to get a single officer to resign his post and rank to protest the disengagement?
After all, Ron-Tal is not alone. His former commander, then chief of staff Moshe Ya'alon, does not hide his severe criticism of the disengagement. Even the outgoing chief rabbi of the IDF, Brigadier General Israel Weiss, struck out belatedly against the sin of uprooting the settlers, saying that he does not understand the logic behind causing so much pain.
The political views of Ron-Tal and Rabbi Weiss were no secret when they were in uniform, but the two chose to express them only at this stage, when their position is not under threat. People on the right were impressed with the passionate statements made by the general, who spoke in terms of the Land of Israel. But what they forgot to ask was whether the Land of Israel was not sufficiently important to warrant this sort of protest a year ago, when it would have endangered the general's career.
Ron-Tal and Weiss respond to such arguments by saying: We were soldiers. We followed orders and recognized the government's authority. They add that they did express their views in closed forums. Still, the suspicion somehow creeps in that had Chief of Staff Dan Halutz extended the chief rabbi's tenure by another year, and had Ron-Tal been appointed GOC Northern Command, as he wished, the criticisms they are now making publicly would not have been heard.
Regarding the right's claim that the army was unprepared for war because it became blunted during the preparations for the disengagement, this is essentially the mirror image of the left's argument that the army lost its edge through focusing on policing the territories. And both sides have a point. However, the fact is that until 2000, the IDF did train for high-intensity conflict. It was the intifada that led to the cuts in training, not the disengagement.
These days, the IDF goes from controversy to controversy. In addition to Ron-Tal, whom the chief of staff called in for a talk, and Halutz's reconciliation with the homo-lesbian community, there has been an effort to scare officers into not leaking information to the press. One can only hope that with so many important matters preoccupying the General Staff, it will also find time to carry out the peripheral task of learning the lessons of the Lebanon war and preparing the army for the next outbreak of violence.
Some of the claims made by retiring Major General Yiftah Ron-Tal, in an interview with the somewhat obscure weekly paper of Kfar Chabad, make sense. His conclusion that the fighting in Lebanon constituted a military failure for Israel is accepted by many in the Israel Defense Forces General Staff. Some of his former colleagues also agree with him that officers at the highest ranks should take personal responsibility and step down. The claim that the IDF wasted valuable time preparing for the disengagement from the Gaza Strip and forgot about a potential confrontation in the North also has some weight.
But the media debate on the issue has revolved around a different question: Was it appropriate for Ron-Tal to make these statements while still, officially, in uniform? The talk-show hosts on morning radio programs, where Ron-Tal was invited to explain some of the statements he made in the aforementioned interview, were critical. The IDF Spokesman's Office was also quick to issue a statement expressing its reservations over Ron-Tal's comments.
In reality, a different issue should be discussed: How is it that the right, despite the fact that a significant number of senior officers share its views, did not manage to get a single officer to resign his post and rank to protest the disengagement?
After all, Ron-Tal is not alone. His former commander, then chief of staff Moshe Ya'alon, does not hide his severe criticism of the disengagement. Even the outgoing chief rabbi of the IDF, Brigadier General Israel Weiss, struck out belatedly against the sin of uprooting the settlers, saying that he does not understand the logic behind causing so much pain.
The political views of Ron-Tal and Rabbi Weiss were no secret when they were in uniform, but the two chose to express them only at this stage, when their position is not under threat. People on the right were impressed with the passionate statements made by the general, who spoke in terms of the Land of Israel. But what they forgot to ask was whether the Land of Israel was not sufficiently important to warrant this sort of protest a year ago, when it would have endangered the general's career.
Ron-Tal and Weiss respond to such arguments by saying: We were soldiers. We followed orders and recognized the government's authority. They add that they did express their views in closed forums. Still, the suspicion somehow creeps in that had Chief of Staff Dan Halutz extended the chief rabbi's tenure by another year, and had Ron-Tal been appointed GOC Northern Command, as he wished, the criticisms they are now making publicly would not have been heard.
Regarding the right's claim that the army was unprepared for war because it became blunted during the preparations for the disengagement, this is essentially the mirror image of the left's argument that the army lost its edge through focusing on policing the territories. And both sides have a point. However, the fact is that until 2000, the IDF did train for high-intensity conflict. It was the intifada that led to the cuts in training, not the disengagement.
These days, the IDF goes from controversy to controversy. In addition to Ron-Tal, whom the chief of staff called in for a talk, and Halutz's reconciliation with the homo-lesbian community, there has been an effort to scare officers into not leaking information to the press. One can only hope that with so many important matters preoccupying the General Staff, it will also find time to carry out the peripheral task of learning the lessons of the Lebanon war and preparing the army for the next outbreak of violence.
No comments:
Post a Comment